Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between
March 2, 2011 and August 31, 2011. This collection is organized by civil
and criminal matters, then by subject matter.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.
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CIVIL MATTERS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Remedies – Privacy Act: Shearson v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
638 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2011)
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of “whether the Privacy Act’s
general exemptions provision, § 522a(j), permits an agency to wholly
exempt systems of records from the civil-remedies provision, § 552a(g),
and thereby avoid all civil liability, even for violations of non-exemptible
provisions.” Id. at 502. The court noted that the 4th, 7th, and 9th
Circuits determined that “an agency can exempt itself from § 552a(g) by
properly promulgating rules.” Id. at 502–03 The D.C. Circuit however,
had found “that an agency cannot escape liability for violating nonexemptible Privacy Act obligations simply by exempting itself from the
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Act’s civil-remedy provisions; rather, an agency may exempt a system of
records from the civil-remedies provision only to the extent that the
underlying substantive duty is exemptible under § 552(a)(j).” Id. at 503.
The 6th Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in finding that “an agency is
permitted to exempt a system of records from the civil-remedies
provision if the underlying substantive duty is exemptible under
§ 552a(j).” Id. at 504. The court disagreed with the 4th, 7th, and 9th
Circuits, stating: “§ 552a(g) provides the general civil remedies for both
exemptible and non-exemptible obligations, it is reasonable to conclude
that Congress intended that the remedy follow the violation, i.e.,
§ 552a(g) is applicable to non-exempted violations.” Id. at 503. Thus,
the 6th Circuit concluded that an agency is not permitted to exempt a
system of records from “claims alleging violation of non-exemptible
Privacy Act provisions . . . .” Id. at 504.
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11 – Plan Cramdown Requirements Under 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(A): River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)
requires that cramdown plans under subsection (iii), that contemplate
selling encumbered assets free and clear of liens at an auction, satisfy the
requirements set forth in Subsection (ii) of the statute. Id. at 649. The
court noted that the 3rd and 5th Circuits determined that “Subsection
(iii)’s scope was not limited by its neighboring subsections and that the
proceeds from the sale of encumbered assets constituted the “indubitable
equivalent” of the secured creditors’ claim. Id. It also noted that the 3rd
Circuit’s dissent found “that the majority’s reading of the statute was at
odds with the text of the statute itself, various canons of statutory
interpretation, the statute’s legislative history, interests expressed in other
parts of the Code and the settled expectations of lenders and borrowers.”
Id. at 648. The 7th Circuit agreed with the 3rd Circuit’s dissent in
finding that, “Subsection (ii), which offers the standard protections to
creditors, [provides] the only way for plans seeking to sell encumbered
assets free and clear of liens to obtain fair and equitable status.” Id. at
653 (internal quotations omitted). The court disagreed with the 3rd and
5th Circuits as “[u]nder their interpretation, plans could qualify for
treatment under Subsection (iii) even if they seek to dispose of
encumbered assets in the ways discussed in Subsections (i) and (ii), but
fail to meet these Subsections’ requirements.” Id. at 652. The 7th Circuit
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stated that their sister courts’ “reading of Subsection (iii) would nullify
its neighboring subsections and ignore the protections for secured
creditors recognized in other Code provisions[.]” Id. at 653. Thus, the
7th Circuit held “that the Code requires that cramdown plans that
contemplate selling encumbered assets free and clear of liens at an
auction satisfy the requirements set forth in Subsection (ii) of the
statute.” Id. at 653.
Chapter 12 – Post-Petition Income Tax: United States v. Dawes (In re
Dawes), 652 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2011)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether income taxes generated from
the sale of a farm asset during a Chapter 12 bankruptcy are taxes
“incurred by the estate” as expressed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 503(b), and
thus subject to downgrade and discharge. Id. at 1238–39. The court
noted that the 9th Circuit determined that the taxes are not subject to
downgrade and discharge because they are not “incurred by the estate,”
while the 8th Circuit found the opposite. Id. at 1239. The 10th Circuit
agreed with the 9th Circuit that the term “incurred by the estate” should
be interpreted according to its plain language, and because a Chapter 12
estate is not liable for post-petition federal income taxes, the estate
cannot incur the tax liability. Id. at 1240. The court disagreed with the
8th Circuit that “incurred by the estate” means tax incurred during
bankruptcy. Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit held post-petition income taxes
generated during Chapter 12 proceedings “are liabilities of the individual
debtor and not the bankruptcy estate,” and therefore, “they are not within
the purview of the bankruptcy proceedings or included in the
reorganization plan.” Id. at 1239.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Appeals – Costs & Attorney Fees: Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit,
420 Fed. App’x. 6 (1st Cir. 2011)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether appellate attorney’s fees may be
included in an appeal bond. Id. at 17. The court noted that the 2nd, 6th,
9th, and 11th Circuits determined that a bond issued under Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 7 may include appellate attorney’s fees if the
applicable statute underlying the litigation contains a fee-shifting
provision that accounts for such fees in its definition of recoverable
costs, and the appellee is eligible to recover them.” Id. The 3rd and D.C.
Circuits, however, found Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e) “to
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restrict the costs calculable for Rule 7 purposes . . . .” Id. at 17–18. The
1st Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 6th, 9th, and 11th Circuits in finding that
“[c]ourts understand . . . fee shifting statutes to account for appellate fees
as well.” Id. at 17. The court disagreed with the 3rd and D.C. Circuits,
as “[those] cases presented distinguishable circumstances since neither
involved a fee-shifting statute.” Id. at 19. Thus, the 1st Circuit
concluded that a district court may include attorney fees in an appellate
bond when “the applicable statute underlying the litigation contains a
fee-shifting provision . . . and appellee is eligible to recover them.” Id. at
17.
Choice of Law – Forum Selection Clauses: Slater v. Energy Servs.
Group Int’l, 634 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2011)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether courts should analyze a forum
selection clause under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(3). Id. at 1332. The court observed that the 6th Circuit
enforced a forum selection clause under § 1404, while the 2nd and 9th
Circuits enforced international forum selection clauses under Rule
12(b)(3). Id. The 11th Circuit noted that it applied Rule 12(b)(3) to a
motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause which mandated a
foreign venue. Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court previously
held that “motions to dismiss based upon forum-selection clauses are
cognizable as motions to dismiss for improper venue.” Id. at 1333
(internal citation omitted). The court extended this holding to motions to
dismiss based on a domestic forum selection clause, adopting a broad
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s aforementioned holding. Id. at
1333. Thus the 11th Circuit concluded “that § 1404(a) is the proper
avenue of relief where a party seeks the transfer of a case to enforce a
forum-selection clause, while Rule 12(b)(3) is the proper avenue for a
party’s request for dismissal based on a forum-selection clause.” Id. at
1336.
Standard of Review – Plain Error: U.S. v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103
(10th Cir. 2011)
The 10th Circuit addressed “whether an error must be plain at the
time of trial or merely at the time of appeal.” Id. at 1107. The court
noted that the 9th and D.C. Circuits have determined that “an error is
plain only if it was clear at the time of the district court’s decision,”
while the 7th and 11th Circuits have stated that “plain error is measured
at the time of appeal . . . .” Id. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 7th and
11th Circuits in finding that “this approach has the advantage of avoiding
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the necessity of distinguishing between cases in which the law at the time
of appeal on the one hand and cases in which it was merely unsettled on
the other.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court disagreed
with the 9th and D.C. Circuits that an error is plain only where the law is
well settled at the time of trial. Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that
plain error is measured at the time of appeal. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Federal Employees – Remedies under the Civil Service Reform Act:
Elgin v. U. S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 641 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2011)
The 1st Circuit addressed “whether there is some implied exception
to the exclusive [Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA)] remedy [where] the
challenge [to termination of employment] . . . is a constitutional one
sounding in equity.” Id. at 11. The court noted that the 3rd and D.C.
Circuits have held that there was an implied exception to the exclusive
CSRA remedy and that federal employees may bring to federal court
constitutional claims relevant to their removal. Id. at 11. Alternatively,
the 2nd and 10th Circuits found that the CSRA remedies were wholly
exclusive and that CSRA employees must bring their constitutional
challenges before the Merits Systems Protection Board, as provided
under the CSRA. Id. at 11. The 1st Circuit agreed with the 2nd and 10th
Circuits, based on its own precedent, its reading of Supreme Court
precedent, and its interpretation of the CSRA’s legislative history. Id.
Thus, the 1st Circuit held that there is no implied exception to the
exclusive CSRA remedy. Id.
First Amendment – Retaliatory Arrest Claim: Howards v.
McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2011)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff bringing a First
Amendment retaliation claim against the government “must show that
the defendants lacked probable cause for the arrest.” Id. at 1147. The
court noted that the 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits determined that plaintiffs
are required to show lack of probable cause for a retaliatory arrest, while
the 9th Circuit found plaintiffs may bring a First Amendment retaliation
claim even where probable cause existed for the arrest. Id. The 10th
Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit in finding that plaintiffs must prove
the absence of probable cause only in malicious prosecution claims and
other retaliation cases involving “complex” causation. Id. at 1148–49.
The court disagreed with the 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits’ interpretation
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that the Supreme Court had created a “no-probable-cause” requirement
in all First Amendment retaliation cases. Id. at 1148. Thus the 10th
Circuit concluded that plaintiffs are not required to show an absence of
probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases under the First Amendment. Id.
at 1148–49.
Property Rights – Prisoner’s Property Rights in Unearned Interest:
Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011)
The 1st Circuit addressed the issue of whether “a prison’s unilateral
suspension of its internal policy of paying interest on inmate accounts
violated the constitutional rights of an affected inmate.” Id. at 51. The
court stated that in order to establish constitutionally protected property
interest, the plaintiff must point to a source that gives rise to such a right.
Id. at 53. The court then noted that the 4th and 11th circuits concluded
that no such right regarding unearned future interest existed. Id. at 54.
The court also noted that the 9th Circuit came to an opposite conclusion
by applying “the mantra that interest follows principal,” but criticized
that conclusion because it failed to give “due weight to the truncation of
prisoner’s property rights that is characteristic of common law” Id. at 54.
After analyzing Rhode Island common law, statutory law, and policy and
practice, the court agreed with the 4th and 11th Circuits and concluded
that none of these could provide a source of property rights in unearned
future interest. Id. at 53–55. Finding no property rights in collecting the
interest, the court ultimately held that “prison inmates lack a
constitutionally protected property right in interest not yet paid.” Id. at
51.
Speech and Debate Clause – Scope of Application: United States v.
Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a district court must “hold a
Kastigar-like hearing to determine whether the Government used
evidence protected by the Speech and Debate Clause to obtain nonprivileged evidence” against a Member of Congress. Id. at 1019. The
court noted that the D.C. Circuit determined that the Clause is violated
when privileged materials are reviewed without the Member of
Congress’s consent because it distracts Members and their staffs from
their legislative work. Id. at 1033. However, the 9th Circuit rejected this
rationale finding that legislative distraction alone cannot serve “as a
touchstone for application of the Clause’s testimonial privilege,” but
rather, “distraction alone precludes inquiry only when the underlying
action is itself precluded.” Id. at 1034–35. The 9th Circuit added that a
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broad privilege would result in a violation of the Clause every time a
court reviewed evidence merely to determine whether the Clause applied
or not. Id. at 1038–39. Thus the 9th Circuit concluded that no
requirement for a Kastigar hearing exists where the actions and choices
for which the Member of Congress was being prosecuted were beyond
the scope of the Speech and Debate Clause. Id. at 1039.
EMPLOYMENT
Benefits – Deference to Administrative Agencies: Weight Loss
Healthcare Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 655 F.3d 1202
(10th Cir. 2011)
The 10th Circuit considered whether it owed deference to the
Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) interpretation of a federal
employee insurance plan. Id. at 1205. The court noted that the 8th and
11th Circuit deferred to OPM’s interpretation because OPM has relevant
expertise and was given broad authority to regulate the field by
Congress. Id. at 1207. The court then noted that the 4th Circuit
disagreed with this view “because contract interpretation is a question of
law clearly within the competence of courts.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court disagreed with the 4th Circuit, finding that an
earlier decision from the 4th Circuit was contrary, and that “[i]t ignore[d]
OPM’s experience and expertise as well as the statutory scheme that
gives OPM the primary and principal role of interpreting health-plan
contracts with federal employees.” Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit agreed
with the 8th and 11th Circuits and held that OPM’s interpretation of the
federal employee insurance plan “is entitled to deference because of its
intimate and extensive involvement in the negotiation and interpretation
of federal health-insurance plans.” Id. at 1205.
FAMILY LAW
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) – Burden of Proof: Sanders
v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2011)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an employer or employee bears
the burden of proof to establish a reason for failing to reinstate an
employee when an employer, defending against a Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) interference claim, “alleges that he had a legitimate
reason not to reinstate an employee.” Id. at 779. The court noted that the
8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits “have all held that [Department of Labor
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(DOL) Regulations 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)] validly shifts to the
employer the burden of proving that an employee . . . would have been
dismissed regardless of the employee’s request for, or taking of, FMLA
leave.” Id. at 780 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The 7th
Circuit, however, relied on its previous case law interpreting the statute,
rather than the plain text of the regulations, and held that the burden of
proof remains with the employee. Id. The 9th Circuit found the majority
rule to be “more natural” and agreed that “the plain language of the
pertinent DOL regulations provides that the burden is on the employer to
show that he had a legitimate reason to deny an employee reinstatement.”
Id. The court also found persuasive the fact that this approach is
consistent with “the Supreme Court’s admonition that the burden of
proof should conform with a party’s superior access to the proof.” Id.
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded “that when an employer seeks to
establish that he has a legitimate reason to deny an employee
reinstatement, the burden of proof on that issue rests with the employer.”
Id.
IMMIGRATION
State Enforcement – Immigration and Naturalization Act: United
States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct.
845 (2011)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether states have “inherent authority to
enforce the civil provisions of federal immigration law.” Id. at 362. The
court noted that the 6th Circuit determined that states do not have such
inherent authority, while the 10th Circuit determined that they do. Id. at
363. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 6th Circuit in finding that, under 8
U.S.C. § 1357(g), “local law enforcement officers [could not] enforce
completed violations of civil immigration law” absent specific
authorization from the Attorney General. Id. The court disagreed with
the 10th Circuit’s finding that Congress presumed states had this power
when it enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). Id. 363–
64. The court found the 10th Circuit’s interpretation of legislative history
unpersuasive because Congress would not have intended “‘to displace
pre-existing . . . authority’ when its purpose . . . was to grant authority it
believed was otherwise lacking.” Id. at 365. The court also found the
10th Circuit’s reasoning unpersuasive because such reasoning requires a
broad reading of § 1357(g)(10), which the 9th Circuit refused to grant.
Id. Thus, the court concluded that states do not possess any inherent
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authority to “enforce the civil provisions of federal immigration law.”
Id. at 365.
TAX
Tax Reform Act – Interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) and
6229(c)(2): Intermountain Ins. Service of Vail v. C.I.R., 650 F.3d 691
(D.C. Cir. 2011)
The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of “how to interpret [I.R.C. §]
6501(e)(1)(A)’s ‘omits from gross income’ language in cases that fall
beyond subsection (i)’s scope.” Id. at 703. The court noted that the 4th,
5th, 9th, and Federal Circuits determined that the Supreme Court
decision of Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), interpreting
§ 275(c), applies to the relevant section. Id. at 700. The 7th Circuit,
however, found “that Colony does not control and that the
Commissioner’s interpretation of sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2)
so aligns with Congress’s clear intent that the Commissioner had no need
even to rely on the regulations.” Id. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the
7th Circuit in finding that Colony was not controlling “because that
decision provides only the best, but not the exclusive, construction of the
phrase ‘omits from gross income . . . .’” Id. The court disagreed with
the 4th, 5th, 9th and Federal Circuits as it found that neither the plain
meaning of the text, the section’s structure, the legislative history, the
passages’ context, nor the reenactment history bars the Commissioner’s
interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A). Id. at 698. Thus, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that the “Court in Colony never purported to interpret
§ 6501(e)(1)(A),” and that nothing in the relevant section
“unambiguously forecloses the Commissioner from interpreting
‘omissions from gross income’ as including basis overstatements.” Id. at
705.
TORTS
Awarding of Costs – Translation Costs in Litigation: Kouichi
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 633 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2011)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a district court may interpret 28
U.S.C. § 1920(6) in such a way that awards the costs of translation
services to the defending party in a tort action. Id. at 1221. The court
noted that the 7th Circuit had determined that the words “interpretation”
and “translation” have distinct definitions and declined to award
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translation service costs. Id. The 7th Circuit specifically construed §
1920(6) to embody the common understanding of an “interpreter” as one
who translates the spoken word, and found that the dictionary definition
of “interpreter,” meaning one who translates a written document,
unreasonably stretched the meaning of § 1920. Id. “The 6th and D.C.
Circuits concluded that ‘translation’ services and ‘interpretation’ services
are interchangeable.” Id. The court reasoned that the 6th Circuit’s
analysis “is more compatible with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which includes a decided preference for the award of costs to
the prevailing party.” Id. The 9th Circuit joined the 6th and D.C.
Circuits in holding “that within the meaning of § 1920(6), the prevailing
party should be awarded costs for services required to interpret either
live speech or written documents into a familiar language, so long as
interpretation of the items is necessary to the litigation.” Id. at 1221–22.
Thus, the 9th Circuit held that § 1920(6) permits courts to award costs
for translation services to defending parties. Id. at 1222.
Torture Victim Protection Act – Corporate Liability: Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether corporations can be held liable
for aiding and abetting violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA). Id. at 58. The court noted that the 9th Circuit held that
corporations may not be held vicariously liable under the TVPA, while
the 11th Circuit found corporations can be liable. Id. The D.C. Circuit
agreed with the 9th Circuit in finding that the statutory text of the TVPA
does not permit liability of corporations. Id. The court based its opinion
on the absence of any statutory text permitting vicarious corporate
liability, and added that, although Congress may provide for such a
theory of liability, it has not done so. Id. Thus, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that corporations cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting
violations of the TVPA. Id.
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CRIMINAL MATTERS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ex Post Facto Clause – Sentencing Guidelines: United States v.
Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2011)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the “application of the
Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 1318. The court
noted that the 7th Circuit determined that the Ex Post Facto Clause does
not apply to advisory regulations like the Sentencing Guidelines, while
the D.C. Circuit found the application of a harsher Guidelines range
presents a constitutional problem. Id. at 1320–21. The D.C. Circuit
found that a constitutional right was violated if “the district court’s
failure to employ the Guidelines in effect at the time the offense was
committed resulted in ‘a substantial risk’ of a more severe sentence.” Id.
at 1321. The 11th Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in finding that the
Sentencing Guidelines, though advisory, implicate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because the D.C. Circuit’s approach “recognizes the ongoing
importance of the Sentencing Guidelines while maintaining the district
Court’s broad discretion to consider relevant information in formulating
an appropriate sentence.” Id. at 1322–23. The 11th Circuit concluded
that a court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the
time of sentencing will violate the Ex Post Facto Clause only when this
choice results in a substantial risk of harsher punishment. Id. at 1322–
23.
CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Money Laundering – Elements under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956: United
States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 2011)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether “proceeds of specified unlawful
activity,” are limited to “profits” where the unlawful activity is the sale
of contraband under the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1956. Id. at 597. The court noted that the 11th Circuit held that
“proceeds” are limited to “profits” only where the unlawful activity is an
illegal gambling operation. Id. at 599. The 8th and 9th Circuits
determined that “proceeds” are not limited to “profits” where the
unlawful activity is a drug offense. Id. at 599. The 5th and 6th Circuits,
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however, found that “proceeds” are limited to “profits” only where the
conviction raises a “merger problem” and where the legislative history
suggests this narrow reading. Id. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 5th
and 6th Circuits in finding that Supreme Court precedent requires an
examination of legislative history. Id. at 599. The court disagreed with
the 11th Circuit in finding that it was required to interpret “proceeds” as
“profits” only in cases involving an illegal gambling operation. Id. at
599. Thus, the 2nd Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend to
limit “proceeds” to “profits” where the unlawful activity is the sale of
contraband. Id. at 600.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Fourth Amendment – Probable Cause: Dougherty v. City of Covina,
654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011)
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether evidence of child molestation,
alone, creates probable cause for a search warrant for child pornography.”
Id. at 899. The court noted that the 2nd and 6th Circuits determined that
evidence of child molestation alone was insufficient to establish probable
cause, while the 8th Circuit determined that evidence of child
molestation was sufficient, as there was an “intuitive relationship
between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of
child pornography.” Id. The 9th Circuit, explaining that “the question of
probable cause is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules,” employed a totality of the circumstances test. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 9th Circuit determined that evidence
of child molestation, under the totality of the circumstances approach,
could create probable cause to search for child pornography in some
instances, though it does not establish probable cause categorically. Id.
Fourth Amendment – Search Warrant: United States v. Bailey, 652
F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2011)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether it is permissible under the
Fourth Amendment to detain a person who leaves a premises subject to a
search warrant immediately before or during the search. Id. at 204. The
court noted that the 5th, 6th, and 7th Circuits determined that detainment
is permissible, while the 8th and 10th Circuits found the opposite. Id. at
204–06. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 5th, 6th, and 7th Circuits in
finding that the interests in law enforcement safety and evidence
preservation outweighed the individual’s de minimis intrusion of being
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briefly detained. Id. at 205. The court disagreed with the 8th and 10th
Circuits, which held that officer safety would not be jeopardized and that
evidence would not be put at risk of being destroyed if the suspect was
not detained. Id. at 205–06. Thus, the 2nd Circuit concluded that
detaining an individual in the process of leaving a premises subject to a
search warrant as soon as practicable does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 206.
4th Amendment Warrantless Search – Burden of Proof: Bogan v.
City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2011)
The 7th Circuit addressed the question of which party bears the
burden of proving exigent circumstances in a § 1983 warrantless-search
action where the police claim that the search was justified based on said
exigent circumstances. Id. at 568. The court first recognized its prior
agreement with the 2nd Circuit determination that the plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of nonpersuasion in a civil case, regardless of whether
the justification is based on consent or some other recognized exception.
Id. at 569. It went on to state that a preexisting split was well-defined:
the 3rd and 10th Circuits place the burden of proof on the officers and
the 2nd, 5th, 7th and 11th Circuits place the burden on the plaintiff. Id.
Next, the court highlighted its own prior precedent, in which it adopted a
burden-shifting scheme applicable to the related issue of consented-to
searches. Id. at 568. While the preexisting split only specifically relates
to the allocation of the burden of proof in other Fourth Amendment
claims (establishing consent in a warrantless arrest and in an arrest
without probable cause), the court considered this inquiry related to the
narrower issue at hand: determining the burden of proof with regard to
exigent circumstances in a warrantless search action. Id. In line with its
prior precedent regarding consented-to searches, the court rejected the
10th Circuit’s reasoning and placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to
establish the absence of exigent circumstances. Id. at 569. The court
explained that the extension of its prior holding was appropriate because
a common 4th Amendment violation occurs in both consent and exigent
circumstance cases. Id. at 568. Thus, the 7th Circuit held that where the
officers come forward with proof of exigent circumstances, the question
posed to the jury is whether or not the plaintiff has met her ultimate
burden of showing that the search was unreasonable in the light of the
existing circumstances. Id. at 571.
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Fifth Amendment – Custodial Interrogation: Burlew v. Hedgpeth,
No. 09-17788, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17323 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2011)
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether a defendant is ‘in custody’
when he is detained in the back of a police car.” Id. at *4. The court
noted that the 4th and 6th Circuits, and a previous 9th Circuit case have
determined that a defendant was in custody where the defendant was not
under arrest but was detained in a police car, while the 7th and 8th
Circuits determined that a defendant was not considered to be “in
custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings while questioned in the back
seat of a squad car. Id. The court then noted that “the Supreme Court
has emphasized that the determination of whether a defendant was in
custody for Miranda purposes is a general one, which affords courts
more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”
Id. at *4–5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 9th Circuit,
without reversing its prior case, held that a state does not unreasonably
apply federal law in finding that a defendant was not in custody when
placed in the back of a police car. Id. at *5.
Fifth Amendment – Non-evidentiary Use of Self-Incriminating
Statements: United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether a prosecutor can make nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony. Id. at 553. The court noted
that the 3rd and 8th Circuits suggested that “non-evidentiary uses of
immunized testimony are barred,” while the 1st, 2nd, 7th, 9th, and 11th
Circuits held to the contrary. Id. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the 1st,
2nd, 7th, 9th and 11th Circuits in finding that Supreme Court precedent
was unconcerned with the “exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at
554 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court stated that to decide
otherwise “would entangle the court in what has hitherto been internal
prosecutorial decision-making. And it would open a new field for
courts’ having to make complex causal judgments of the sort already
required to assure clean evidence.” Id. Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that prosecutors can use such immunized statements, at a minimum, in
forming decisions to indict. Id.
Mandamus Petitions – Crime Victims’ Rights Act: United States v.
Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
The D.C. Circuit addressed the appropriate standard of review for
petitions for mandamus filed pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
(CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Id. at 532. The court observed that the 5th,
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6th, and 10th Circuits apply “the traditional standard for mandamus,
under which [a crime victim] must show that: (1) she has a clear and
indisputable right to relief; (2) the district court has a clear duty to act;
and (3) no other adequate remedy is available to her.” Id. Four circuits
do not follow this standard. Id. at 532. The 9th Circuit uses an abuse of
discretion or legal error standard. Id. at 533. The 2nd Circuit uses an
abuse of discretion standard. Id. The 11th Circuit granted a petition
“without asking whether victim had a clear and indisputable right to
relief.” Id. The 3rd Circuit stated in dicta that “mandamus relief is
available under a different, and less demanding, standard under 18
U.S.C. § 3771.” Id. The D.C. Circuit adopted the traditional mandamus
standard because “there is no indication that Congress intended to invoke
any other standard.” Id. The court also reasoned that if Congress
intended to provide “ordinary appellate review via mandamus [through §
3771(d)(3)], it is unclear what purpose § 3771 (d)(4) serves by providing
the government the same thing on direct appeal.” Id. Furthermore, the
D.C. Circuit opined that “the abbreviated 72-hour deadline suggests that
Congress understood it was providing the traditional ‘extraordinary
remedy’ of mandamus.” Id. Determining whether the lower court
committed a “clear and indisputable” error within 72 hours is feasible
because extensive briefing or prolonged deliberation is not normally
required, whereas “full briefing and plenary appellate review within the
72-hour hour deadline will almost always be impossible.” Id. Thus, the
D.C. Circuit held that the traditional standard for mandamus applies to
petitions for mandamus filed under the CVRA. Id.
Power to Grant Writ of Habeas Corpus – Mootness: Rhodes v.
Judiscak, 653 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2011)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a petition for habeas corpus
relief is moot when it challenges the calculation of an already served
prison sentence. Id. at 1148. The court noted that the 5th and 11th
Circuits determined that a petition is not moot because a district court
could consider a favorable ruling as a factor in a later petition for a
shortened supervised release. Id. at 1148–49. The court noted that the
3rd and D.C. Circuits held that “whether a particular collateral
consequence is sufficient to defeat mootness turns on the likelihood that
a favorable decision would redress the injury.” Id. at 1149. The 11th
Circuit agreed with the 3rd and D.C. Circuits, but not based on the low
likelihood of redress. Id. Rather, the court stated that the petition is
moot because redress is impossible, because neither it nor the district
could provide a remedy for the harm alleged. Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit
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held that a § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief challenging only the
calculation of an already served prison sentence is moot. Id.
Witness Tampering – Conduct Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b): United
States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2011)
The 9th Circuit considered witness tampering under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512 and addressed “what type of conduct falls within the ambit of”
the statute’s phrase “corruptly persuades.” Id. at 1183, 1186. The court
noted that the 2nd and 11th Circuits “conclude[d] that persuasion with an
‘improper purpose’ qualifies (such as self-interest in impeding an
investigation),” while the 3rd Circuit found that “there must be
something more inherently wrongful about the persuasion (such as
bribery or encouraging someone to testify falsely).” Id. at 1186. The 9th
Circuit agreed with the 3rd Circuit, stating that, when a privilege not to
testify exists, “the phrase ‘corruptly persuades’ cannot mean simply
‘persuades with the intent to hinder communication to law enforcement’
because such an interpretation would render the word ‘corruptly’
meaningless.” Id. at 1187. In contrast, the 2nd and 11th Circuits found
the term “corruptly persuade” to include merely persuading a witness to
invoke his or her legal privileges not to testify. Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit
found that the term “corruptly” is “normally associated with ‘wrongful,
immoral, depraved, or evil;” therefore, “a defendant could not be shown
to act with ‘consciousness of wrongdoing’ merely by asking [a witness
with a legal privilege not to testify] to withhold testimony absent some
other wrongful conduct, such as coercion, intimidation, bribery,
suborning perjury, etc.” Id. at 1189–90.
IMMIGRATION
Right of Review – Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: Bright v. Holder,
649 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2011)
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether an alien is a fugitive where . . .
he has maintained the same address throughout his removal proceedings,
the address was known to the [Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)], and DHS made no attempt to locate or arrest the alien following
his failure to report for removal,” thus barring further review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ removal decision. Id. at 400. The court
noted that the 2nd and 7th Circuits “have applied the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine in this context, reasoning that even when an
alien’s location is known, immigration officials must deploy resources to

156

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:137

bring him in. And, of course, he may not be so easy to find once his
litigation options are exhausted.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Conversely, the 9th Circuit found “that an alien’s failure to report for
removal did not make her a fugitive during the pendency of her petition
for review because her whereabouts were known to her counsel, DHS,
and the court.” Id. The 5th Circuit agreed with the 2nd and 7th Circuits
in finding that “[a]pplying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to those
who evade removal despite their address being known by DHS will
encourage voluntary surrenders, the efficient operation of the courts, and
respect for the judiciary and the rule of law.” Id. Thus, the 5th Circuit
concluded that an alien is a fugitive where he has maintained the same
address throughout his removal proceedings, and the address was known
to the DHS. Id.
REMEDIES
Restitution Awards – Crime Victims’ Rights Act: United States v.
Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of “whether the proximate
cause requirement in the catch-all category also applies to the preceding
categories” of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA). Id. at 535. The
3rd, 9th, and 11th Circuits have held that it does, while the 5th Circuit
has held that it does not. Id. The D.C. Circuit held that all of the
categories require proximate cause because principles of tort and
criminal law state that “a defendant is only liable for harms he
proximately caused.” Id. Further, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that since
18 U.S.C. § 2259 defines “victim” as a person harmed “as a result of” the
defendant’s offense, the statute invokes the same principle. Id. at 536.
Thus, the D.C. Circuit joined the plurality of circuits in holding that the
proximate cause requirement applies to the all of the categories of
victim’s losses. Id. at 535.
SENTENCING
Early Release Programs – Bureau of Prisons Policy: Licon v.
Ledezma, 638 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2011)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
policy categorically excluding prisoners convicted of felon in possession
of a firearm charges from eligibility for a parole or early release program
was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
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accordance with the law.” Id. at 1307. The court noted that the 3rd, 5th
and 8th Circuits determined that the BOP provided sufficient justification
for the policy, while the 9th Circuit found the policy arbitrary and
capricious due to a lack of a non-arbitrary basis for the categorical
exclusion. Id. at 1308–09. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 5th and
8th Circuits in finding that the policy was not arbitrary or capricious
because the BOP successfully urged that “the offense conduct of both
armed offenders and certain recidivists suggests that they pose a
particular danger to the public.” Id. at 1309. The court disagreed with
the 9th Circuit because the BOP’s justification provided sufficient insight
into its rationale. Id. at 1309–10. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that
the BOP policy was valid as it sufficiently satisfied the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Id. at 1309.

